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Abstract
For di⁄erent purposes, economists may use di⁄erent topologies on types. We char-
acterize the relationship among these various topologies. First, we show that for any
general types, convergence in the uniform-weak topology implies convergence in both
the strategic topology and the uniform strategic topology. Second, we explicitly con-
struct a type which is not the limit of any ￿nite types under the uniform strategic
topology, showing that the uniform strategic topology is strictly ￿ner than the strategic
topology. With these results, we can linearly rank various topologies on the universal
type space, which gives a clear picture of the relationship between the implication of
types for beliefs and their implication for behaviors.
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11 Introduction
If two agents have similar beliefs on some payo⁄-relevant uncertainty, do they always make
similar decisions? In the single-person-decision-making setup, where proximity of beliefs
about uncertainty can be measured by the standard weak￿-topology, the answer is clearly yes.
The answer is much more complicated in the multi-person-game setup where agents￿beliefs
about each other￿ s beliefs play a crucial role in determining the outcome of the interaction.
In this setup, do similar beliefs still imply similar behaviors?
One compact way to formulate the complicated object of ￿beliefs about beliefs￿is to
use the notion of types developed by Harsanyi (1967/1968). A player￿ s type speci￿es a belief
over the set of unknown relevant parameters and opponents￿type pro￿les. Mertens and
Zamir (1985) shows that the set of all coherent hierarchies of beliefs is the universal type
space and Harsanyi￿ s idea su⁄ers no loss of generality.
In practice, an ideal formulation of an economic situation may involve a very compli-
cated type space which is hard to analyze directly. For reasons of tractability, economists
may therefore replace this ideal formulation with some simpler type space in order to solve
a simpler problem. To make this approximation meaningful, we should require that these
simpler types be "close" to the true types so that they will exhibit "similar" behaviors in
games. To measure the "closeness" of types, we need to de￿ne a topology on types.
Two kinds of information are encapsulated in a type. On the one hand, de￿ned directly
on hierarchies of beliefs, a type contains an agent￿ s belief information. On the other hand, as
shown in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) [hereafter DFM], any two di⁄erent Mertens-
Zamir types have di⁄erent behaviors in some game, and hence, the behaviors of an agent are
also implicitly encoded in a type. We can therefore de￿ne topologies on types according to
these two aspects. Examples of "belief" topologies include the product topology introduced
by Mertens and Zamir (1985) and the uniform-weak topology introduced by Di Tillio and
Faingold (2007). Examples of "behavior" topologies are the strategic topology and the uni-
form strategic topology both introduced by DFM. A careful study of the connection among
these topologies will reveal the relationship between the belief implication of types and the
behavior implication of types, which is the main theme of this paper.
2The product topology is used by Mertens and Zamir to achieve their homeomorphism
result. A sequence of types tn converges to a type t in the product topology if and only if
the kth-order belief of tn converges to that of t for any k. Since proximity of tails of the
hierarchies of tn and t is not required, it is now well known that we may have two types
which are close under the product topology but exhibit very di⁄erent strategic behaviors
(see Rubinstein (1989)).
This raises the question as to whether there exists a topology under which nearby types
always have similar strategic behavior (see Monderer and Samet (1989), Monderer and Samet
(1996), Kajii and Morris (1998), and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006)). In particular,
DFM propose the strategic topology which is just strong enough to guarantee that for every
￿nite game, the correspondence which maps types into "￿interim-correlated-rationalizable
("-ICR) actions is continuous. More precisely, DFM show that upper-hemicontinuity of the
"-ICR correspondence under strategic convergence is equivalent to product convergence, and
it is precisely the lower-hemicontinuity property which makes strategic convergence a more
stringent requirement.
DFM also introduce the notion of uniform strategic convergence, which adds to the
notion of strategic convergence the additional requirement that the degree of similarity of
"-ICR actions is uniform over all bounded ￿nite games. In contrast to the strategic topology,
the uniform strategic topology has its own importance, especially when applied to mechanism
design. We discuss this importance further in Section 5.1.
Though useful, DFM￿ s de￿nitions of strategic topologies are complex since they involve
direct reference to best replies, which are tied to games. In particular, we are not able to
tell whether a sequence of types converges in the strategic topology, unless we study the
behaviors of all these types in all ￿nite games. To address this issue, Di Tillio and Faingold
(2007) propose the uniform-weak topology. A sequence of types tn converges to a type t
in the uniform-weak topology if and only if the kth-order belief of tn converges to that of t
for any order k and the rate of convergence is uniform over k. Di Tillio and Faingold show
that around any ￿nite type, the strategic topology is fully characterized by the uniform-weak
topology.
To characterize the relationship among these various topologies, we ￿rst study the im-
3plication of uniform-weak convergence around general types. Our ￿rst main result (Theorem
1) shows that uniform-weak convergence always guarantees uniform strategic convergence
(hence also strategic convergence) around any types. This gives a su¢ cient condition for
uniform strategic convergence (hence, also for strategic convergence), which is easy to use.1
Coupled with Di Tillio and Faingold￿ s result, we see that around ￿nite types, uniform-weak
convergence, strategic convergence and uniform strategic convergence are all equivalent.
In a recent paper, Ely and Peski (2007) propose an insightful partition of the universal
type space into regular and critical types. Regular types are types around which the strategic
topology is equivalent to the product topology. Around critical types the strategic topology
is strictly ￿ner. Ely and Peski (2007) o⁄er this surprisingly concise characterization of critical
types: a type is critical if and only if for some p > 0, it has common p-belief for some closed
proper subset in the universal type space. Therefore, ￿nite type spaces as well as other type
spaces typically considered in applications consist entirely of critical types.
Our ￿rst main result leaves open the question as to whether Di Tillio and Faingold￿ s
equivalence result on ￿nite types can be extended to all critical types, i.e., does strategic
convergence also imply uniform-weak convergence around any critical type? To answer this
question, we construct an in￿nite critical type which cannot be approximated by any sequence
of ￿nite types under the uniform strategic topology. This result, coupled with our ￿rst main
result and DFM￿ s denseness result for ￿nite types under the strategic topology, shows that
the Di Tillio and Faingold￿ s equivalence result does not hold for a general critical type.
Moreover, in sharp contrast to DFM￿ s denseness result, our second main result (Theorem
2) shows that ￿nite types are nowhere dense under the uniform strategic topology.2 Hence,
by our ￿rst main result, ￿nite types are nowhere dense under the uniform-weak topology as
well.
Given two topologies = and =0, let "= ￿ =0" mean that = is weakly ￿ner than =0
1As shown in Di Tillio and Faingold (2007), the uniform-weak topology is a generalized notion of the
common p-belief introduced by Monderer and Samet (1989).
2DFM conjecture that ￿nite types are not dense under the uniform strategic topology. They aim to use
their Proposition 2 to prove this conjecture. However, Chen and Xiong (2008) prove that their Proposition
2 is not true by constructing a counterexample. Hence, prior to the current paper, whether ￿nite types were
dense under the uniform strategic topology was an open question.
4and let "= ￿ =0" mean that = is strictly ￿ner than =0. Our main contribution can be
summarized as follows. Our ￿rst main result shows that [uniform-weak topology]￿[uniform
strategic topology].3 Coupled with DFM￿ s denseness result, our second main result shows
that [uniform strategic topology]￿[strategic topology]. Moreover, DFM show that [strate-
gic topology]￿[product topology]. Therefore, we show that these topologies are related as
follows.
[uniform-weak topology] ￿ [uniform strategic topology] ￿ [strategic topology] ￿ [product topology].
The next section of this paper contains basic de￿nitions and notations. In Section 3, we
present our ￿rst main result and a sketch of the proof. We turn to the issue of non-denseness
of ￿nite types in Section 4. In Section 5, we o⁄er some discussion about related issues. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, for any arbitrary separable metric space Y with metric dY, let ￿(Y )
be the space of all probability measures on the Borel ￿-algebra of Y endowed with the weak*-
topology. It is well known that the weak*-topology is metrizable with the Prohorov distance
￿ de￿ned as
￿(￿;￿
0) = inf f￿ > 0 : ￿(E) ￿ ￿
0 (E
￿) + ￿ for every Borel set E ￿ Y g, 8￿, ￿
0 2 ￿(Y )
where E￿ ￿ fy0 : infy2E dY (y0;y) < ￿g. Unless explicitly noted, all product spaces will be
endowed with the product topology and subspaces with the relative topology. Every ￿nite
or countable set is endowed with the discrete topology and denote the cardinality of a ￿nite
set E by jEj. Moreover, let supp￿ denote the support of a measure ￿ de￿ned on a ￿nite set.
Finally, for any E ￿ Y and y 2 Y , let 1E be the indicator function on E and ￿y be the point
mass on y.
For simplicity, assume that there are two players, player 1 and player 2. Given a player
i 2 f1;2g, let ￿i denote the other player in f1;2g. The basic uncertainty is a ￿nite set which
3Whether [uniform-weak topology]￿[uniform strategic topology] is true remains an open question, for
which we do not have an answer.
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For each k ￿ 1, let ￿k : T ! ￿
￿
Y k￿1￿
be the natural projection. For every player i and
k ￿ 1, let Ti and Y k
i denote the copies of T and Y k respectively, write ￿k






for ￿k, and de￿ne T k
i = ￿k
i (Ti). An element ti 2 Ti is a type of player i. For simplicity, we
will write tk
i instead of ￿k
i (ti) for the kth-order belief of type ti.4 By the result of Mertens
and Zamir (1985), Ti (endowed with product topology) is homeomorphic to ￿(￿ ￿ T￿i).
Let ￿￿
i denote this homeomorphism. In the Mertens-Zamir construction, for any type ti, the
marginal distribution of ￿￿
i (ti) on Y
k￿1
￿i agrees with the distribution tk
i.
Let ￿0 be the discrete metric on Y 0 = ￿, i.e., ￿0 (￿;￿
0) = 1 if ￿ 6= ￿
0 and ￿0 (￿;￿) = 0.
For k ￿ 1, let ￿k be the Prohorov metric on ￿
￿
Y k￿1￿
with respect to the metric dk￿1 on



















As de￿ned by Di Tillio and Faingold (2007), the uniform-weak topology is generated by the
metric
d







for types t and s in T .
Following DFM, we assume that there is a ￿xed exogenous bound M > 0 for the payo⁄s
of all ￿nite games we consider. Let G = (Ai;gi)i=1;2 be a ￿nite game where Ai is a ￿nite set
of actions for player i and gi : Ai￿A￿i￿￿ ! [￿M;M] is the payo⁄function. For ￿ ￿ 0, we
will use the following recursive de￿nition of ￿￿interim-correlated-rationalizable set which is
equivalent to the ￿xed-point de￿nition (see Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)). Let








4Note that T k
i = ￿k
i (Ti) and hence when we write tk
i 2 T k
i without specifying the type ti, tk
i should be





















i=1;2 , 8k ￿ 1,
and ai 2 Rk
i (ti;G;￿) if and only if there exists a measurable function ￿￿i : ￿￿T￿i ! ￿(A￿i)
such that5
supp￿￿i (￿;t￿i) ￿ R
k￿1
￿i (t￿i;G;￿) for ￿
￿





i;￿) ￿ ￿￿i (￿;t￿i)]￿
￿
i (ti)[(￿;dt￿i)] ￿ ￿￿ for all a
0
i 2 Ainfaig where
gi (ai;a
0
i;￿) ￿ (gi (ai;a￿i;￿) ￿ gi (a
0
i;a￿i;￿))a￿i2A￿i .

















i (ti;G;￿) depends only on the kth-order belief of type ti.
Through the following two lemmas, we will reach an alternative characterization of the
￿￿ICR set which will be used in the proof of Theorem 1. Their proofs can be found in
Appendix A.1. First, in the de￿nition of Rk
i (ti;G;￿) above, a conjecture ￿￿i is a measurable
function from ￿ ￿ T￿i to ￿(A￿i). Since we will study the in￿ uence of kth-order beliefs
on Rk





i (ti;G;￿) = Ai for all ti and i. For k ￿ 1, ai 2 R
k
i (ti;G;￿) if and only if
there exists a measurable function ￿￿i : ￿ ￿ T
k￿1









￿i (t￿i;G;￿) for t
k





























￿ ￿￿ for all a
0
i 2 Ai, (2)
where ￿ ￿ T 0
￿i ￿ ￿.
5Throughout the paper ￿￿￿stands for the inner product of two vectors with the same dimension.
7Lemma 1 R
k
i (ti;G;￿) = Rk
i (ti;G;￿) for every integer k ￿ 0, every ti, and every player i.
Hereafter, a measurable function ￿￿i from ￿￿T
k￿1
￿i to ￿(A￿i) which satis￿es condition
(1) is said to be a valid conjecture. Moreover, an action ai which satis￿es condition (2) is said
to be a ￿￿best reply under ￿￿i for type ti. Second, the following result shows that proving
ai 2 R
k
i (ti;G;￿) is equivalent to proving that for any mixed action ￿ 2 ￿(Ainfaig), we can
￿nd a valid conjecture ￿￿i (which may vary with ￿) such that playing ai is ￿-better than
playing ￿. Note that this equivalent characterization reverses the quanti￿er of (2) which
requires a valid conjecture ￿￿i working for all a0
i (and hence for all ￿ 2 ￿(Ainfaig)).6
Lemma 2 For any positive integer k, any ￿ ￿ 0, any ￿nite game G, and any type ti 2 Ti,
ai 2 Rk
i (ti;G;￿) if and only if for every ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 ￿(Ainfaig) there is a valid conjecture
￿￿i [￿] : ￿ ￿ T
k￿1



















￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿.
For each ti 2 Ti, de￿ne hi (tijai;G) to be the minimal ￿ under which an action ai is
￿￿rationalizable for ti in G, i.e.,
hi (tijai;G) = minf￿ : ai 2 Ri (ti;G;￿)g.7
Fix ￿ 2 (0;1). Let Gm be the collection of all games where each player has m actions and the
payo⁄s are bounded by M. Let G be the collection of all two-player ￿nite games with payo⁄s
bounded by M. Following DFM, we de￿ne the strategic topology and the uniform strategic









jhi (tijai;G) ￿ hi (sijai;G)j for types ti and si in Ti;
d
us (ti;si) ￿ sup
ai2Ai(G);G2G
jhi (tijai;G) ￿ hi (sijai;G)j for types ti and si in Ti.
Clearly, dus (ti;si) ￿ ds (ti;si).
6This minimax step is conceptually di⁄erent from the standard equivalence between the never-best reply
and a strictly dominated strategy, though the technical content is similar.
7DFM￿ s Proposition 1 shows that the minimum exsits.
83 duw￿convergence ) dus￿convergence
We are now ready to state our main result as follows.
Theorem 1 For any " > 0 and two types ti and si in Ti with duw (ti;si) ￿ ", we have
dus (ti;si) ￿ 6M" and hence ds (ti;si) ￿ 6M".
Theorem 1 is an immediate consequence of the following proposition.






￿ ", we have Rk
i (ti;G;￿) ￿ Rk
i (si;G;￿ + 6M") for every integer k ￿ 0.
The formal proof of Proposition 1 is long and will be presented in Appendix A.2. Here
we o⁄er a sketch to highlight the essential ideas. We prove this proposition by induction on
k and divide the proof of the induction step into ￿ve sub-steps. We now provide a roadmap
by describing the role of each step.
First, for ai 2 Rk
i (ti;G;￿), there is some valid conjecture ￿￿i under which ai is a ￿￿best
reply for type ti. Our goal is to show that ai 2 Rk
i (si;G;￿ + 6M") by ￿nding another valid
conjecture ￿0
￿i under which ai is a (￿ + 6M")￿best reply for type si. By Lemmas 1 and 2,























￿ ￿￿ ￿ 6M" ￿ ￿. (3)
To ￿nd the desired ￿0
￿i, we observe ￿rst that sk














s where ￿￿i randomizes among ￿￿rationalizable
actions of player ￿i (step 1). Then, we de￿ne ￿0
￿i = ￿￿i on T
k￿1


















￿rst ￿nd a ￿nite partition f￿mg of ￿(A￿i) such that in each partition cell, there is some
representative probability vector qm which supnorm-approximates every q in ￿m. We then








9Second, step 3 obtains a suitable measurable extension of ￿0






the induction hypothesis can be invoked to take care of the validity of ￿0
￿i. Third, in step 4,
we solve the double-counting problem which arises when we specify ￿0










. Here we will see the advantage of allowing ￿0
￿i to depend on ￿. Given













￿" obtained in step 3 whenever gi (ai;￿;￿)￿qm ￿
gi (ai;￿;￿
0) ￿ qm0. Step 5 illustrates the idea of proving (3) under ￿0
￿i.














































￿ 1 ￿ ". Since
the payo⁄ has a uniform bound M, how to de￿ne ￿0
















we can take care of its validity by simply choosing ￿0
￿i to be identical to ￿￿i. The key issue















￿i , which will be discussed
in step 3.
3.2 Step 2: discretize ￿(A￿i)
For the conjecture ￿0
￿i that we are about to de￿ne, we will prove ai 2 Rk
i (si;G;￿ + 6M")






be applied to evaluate the payo⁄di⁄erence. To solve this problem, we discretize the simplex
￿(A￿i). Note that ￿(A￿i) is a (jA￿ij ￿ 1)-dimensional compact set. Therefore, for any
positive integer h, we can ￿nd a ￿nite partition f￿mg
￿
m=1 of ￿(A￿i) such that qm 2 ￿m
is a representative element of ￿m, and the supnorm of (qm ￿ q) is no more than 1
h for any
q 2 ￿m.
We can partition T
k￿1





































belongs to F ￿
m . This approximation has at most an error of
2MjA￿ij
h which can
be arbitrarily small if h is su¢ ciently large.
3.3 Step 3: measurable extension of the conjecture















￿i . By step 1, we have de￿ned
￿0
￿i = ￿￿i on T
k￿1
￿i . By step 2, T
k￿1

















￿" for each (￿;m). We
have to take care of two requirements to guarantee the validity of ￿0
￿i. First, ￿0
￿i must be

















must be close to qm so that
the approximation in step 2 is still valid. These requirements are handled by the following
lemma whose proof can be found in Appendix A.2.1.
Lemma 3 Consider a separable metric space (Y;dY), a Borel set F ￿ Y , and " > 0.
Suppose f : F ! Z is a measurable function from F to another measurable space Z. Then,
there is a measurable function f" : F " ! Z such that f" = f on F, and for every y 2 F "nF,
f" (y) = f (y0) for some y0 2 F with dY (y;y0) < ".










￿" but outside F ￿























m and still preserve mea-
surability. The validity of ￿0
￿i will then be granted by the induction hypothesis. Moreover,
by doing so we reduce the comparison of the expected payo⁄s to the much more tractable




￿" and F ￿
m subject to a dou-
ble counting problem to be discussed in the next step. That is, the expected payo⁄s for
ti under ￿￿i and for si under ￿0
￿i can be approximated by
P





















113.4 Step 4: the double-counting problem





































? To solve this problem, it is important to recall
Lemma 2 which allows us to ￿x ￿ 2 ￿(Ainfaig) before ￿nding the conjecture ￿0
￿i to prove















, we can simply assign ￿0





￿" if gi (ai;￿;￿)￿qm ￿ gi (ai;￿;￿
0)￿qm0. This will make the expected value
of
￿
gi (ai;￿;￿) ￿ ￿0
￿i (￿;t￿i)
￿
as large as possible and help us to rationalize ai.
Formally, we can relabel the elements in fF ￿









gi (ai;￿;￿1) ￿ q
m1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ gi (ai;￿;￿N) ￿ q
mN.
For notational simplicity, we often write Fn instead of F ￿n
mn when no confusion may arise. By







to follow the extension on (Fn)
" with







. Formally, this amounts to
modifying the sets f(Fn)
"g to the sets fEng which are de￿ned as follows, and de￿ne ￿0
￿i
following the extension in step 3 on each En.
E1 = (F1)







for n ￿ 2.












n=1 [gi (ai;￿;￿n) ￿ qmn]sk
i [En] without double-counting.
3.5 Step 5: combining sets
The last step is to show that the di⁄erence of the two approximated payo⁄s is not large, i.e.,
N X
n=1










Let An = gi (ai;￿;￿n)￿qmn and Bn = sk
i (En)￿tk





n=1 in a reverse order, i.e., let Cn = AN￿n+1 and Dn = BN￿n+1 for
every n = 1;:::;N.
12The following claim will be useful in showing (4) and is formally proved in Appen-










Claim 1 We have
Pl
n=1 Bn ￿ ￿" and
Pl
n=1 Dn ￿ " for 1 ￿ l ￿ N.
We now sketch the idea for the proof of (4). First, recall from the previous step that
A
1 ￿ A
2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ A
N.
For heuristic purpose, assume that N = 3 and A3 ￿ 0. We prove that
P3
n=1 AnBn ￿ ￿2M"
in two steps. If fBng are all nonnegative, then
P3
n=1 AnBn ￿ 0 > ￿2M". If fBng are
all non-positive, then
P3
n=1 AnBn ￿ 2M
P3
n=1 Bn ￿ ￿2M" because of Claim 1 and our
assumption that jAnj ￿ 2M for all n.
The main problem is to deal with the situation in which B1, B2, and B3 have di⁄erent
signs. For example, suppose B1 > 0, B2 < 0, and B3 < 0. We use the following trick. Since
B1 > 0 and A1 ￿ A2, we will not increase the value of
P3
n=1 AnBn if B1 is ￿moved￿from
being multiplied by A1 to being multiplied by A2. That is,
P3
n=1 AnBn ￿ A2 (B1 + B2) +



















where second inequality follows because both (B1 + B2) and B3 are non-positive and jAnj ￿
2M; the last inequality follows fromClaim 1. If (B1 + B2) > 0, then the value of A2 (B1 + B2)+
A3B3 decreases if B1+B2 is further ￿moved￿from being multiplied by A2 to being multiplied


















where the last inequality follows from jA3j ￿ 2M and Claim 1.
Our argument takes advantage of the property that An is decreasing in n so that
￿moving￿a positive B toward being multiplied by a smaller A does not increase the value.
After all these ￿moves￿are done, only the last term may have a positive coe¢ cient B. If
13the last term is negative, we go back to the single-signed case. If the last B is positive, since
fAng are all nonnegative, we can simply throw out AnBn without increasing the value and
also go back to the single-signed case.8 The general proof involves dividing the summation
PN
n=1 AnBn into two groups. One group has all the nonnegative Ans and the other group
has all the negative Ans. For both groups, we can invoke a similar trick and Claim 1 and
conclude
PN
n=1 AnBn ￿ ￿4M" (see the proofs of Claims 2 and 3 in Appendix A.2 for details).
4 Non-denseness of ￿nite types
In this section, we ￿rst show by an example that ￿nite types are not dense under the
uniform strategic topology. We achieve this goal by directly constructing an (in￿nite) type
t￿
i such that dus(t￿
i;ti) ￿ M
16 for any ￿nite type ti. Based upon the example, we go one
step further to show that the set of ￿nite types is nowhere dense in the universal type
space, i.e., the complement of the uniform strategic closure of ￿nite types is open and dense.
Finally, we remark t￿
i is a critical type in the sense of Ely and Peski (2007) and comment on
the implication of our example to the relationship between the strategic topology and the
uniform-weak topology around critical types.
Throughout this section, consider the case that ￿ = f0;1g. This simpli￿cation allows
us to follow Morris (2002) to de￿ne the iterated expectations of a type t = (￿1;￿2;:::) 2 T
which will be used later. Let ￿0 : Y 0 ! [0;1] be de￿ned as ￿0 = 1f￿=1g and
b ￿k (t) = ￿k (￿k) ￿
Z
Y k￿1
￿k￿1d￿k, 8k ￿ 1.






1. Say a sequence of iterated expectations x 2 [0;1]
1 is
generated by a type t if x = b ￿ (t). We know that every x 2 [0;1]
1 can be generated by some
type t 2 T (see (Morris, 2002, Example)).
We are now ready to de￿ne the type t￿
i. Let t￿
i be the type which has the following
8Note that we cannot simply delete all AnBn such that Bn > 0. Consider the special case we discuss
here for example. While we have
P3
n=1 AnBn ￿ A2B2 + A3B3, we cannot apply Claim 1 to show that
A2B2 + A3B3 ￿ ￿2M". Recall that B2 + B3 = sk
i (E2 [ E3) ￿ tk
i (F2 [ F3). Since (E2 [ E3) may not be
equal to (F2 [ F3)





















(1;1;::::;1), if n is odd;
(0;0;::::;0), if n is even.
That is, b ￿ (t￿



















i);:::) for n = 1;2;:::.
Note that an 6= am for n 6= m. For k = 1;2;:::, let (an)k be the kth element of the sequence
an. One feature of an, which will be useful later in the proof, is that (an)k = (an+k￿1)1.
Let b Ti ￿ b T￿i ￿ Ti ￿ T￿i be the smallest (w.r.t. set-inclusion) belief-closed subset such
that t￿
i 2 b Ti. Observe that 0 (and 1) is the minimum (and maximum) that a kth-order
expectation can achieve. Since b ￿ (t￿
i) = (1;0;0;1;1;1;0;0;0;0;:::), there is a unique type t￿
i
in Ti which has the following hierarchy of beliefs:
￿ ￿rst-order belief: point mass on ￿ = 1;
￿ second-order belief: point mass on [player ￿i believes ￿ = 0 with probability 1];
￿ third-order belief: point mass on [player ￿i believes with probability 1 that player i
believes with probability 1 that ￿ = 0], and so on.
Let t(1) = t￿
i. Moreover, let t(n) denote the unique type in T that generates the iterated
expectations an, for n ￿ 2. Hence,
￿
￿ [t(n)][b ￿1 (t(n));t(n + 1)] = 1 for n ￿ 1. (5)
That is, type t￿
i believes his opponent is t(2) with probability 1; type t(n) believes his
opponent is t(n + 1) with probability 1 (cf. (Morris, 2002, Example) and Mertens and
Zamir (1985)). Therefore, b ￿
￿
b Ti [ b T￿i
￿
= fa1;a2;:::g.
We now show that ￿nite types are not dense under the uniform strategic topology. We
provide an outline of our argument here, and the rigorous proof can be found in Appen-
dix A.3.1. It is helpful to consider ￿rst the following modi￿ed version of the higher-order
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While G = (Ai;gi)i=1;2 is a game with in￿nitely many actions, we will show how it can be
modi￿ed to a ￿nite game in Appendix A.3.1. In this game, a player￿ s actions are a0, a1,
a2,.... The action a0 always generates the maximal payo⁄ 0.10 If the player chooses an with
n ￿ 1, he gets the in￿mum over the quadratic losses between the ￿rst coordinate of player
i￿ s action and ￿, the quadratic loss between the second coordinate of player i￿ s action and
player ￿i￿ s ￿rst coordinate, and so on. That is, it is a coordination game in which a player
tries to match the state of nature and his opponent￿ s action. The players can achieve the
maximal payo⁄ 0 by either taking the safe action a0 or having perfect coordination with
nature as well as every coordinate of his opponent￿ s action.
First, we have a1 2 Ri (t￿
i;0) because for each k each player of type t(n) 2 b Ti can
rationalize an by holding the belief that t(n + 1) will choose the action an+1. Second, we
show that for some positive but small enough ￿, a1 = 2 Ri (ti;￿) for every ￿nite type ti. Let
Ti￿T￿i ￿ Ti￿T￿i be the smallest belief-closed subset such that ti 2 Ti. Suppose instead that
a1 is ￿￿rationalizable for ti. Then, (A) player i must believe most of his opponent￿ s types
(which are in the support of ￿￿
i [ti]) are playing a2 so as to get almost perfect coordination;























Consider two types t and t0 such that their expectations di⁄er only at the Nth-order. On the one hand, we
should choose a ￿N large enough so that the game separates t and t0 in the sense that the minimal ￿ to
￿￿ rationalize some action under these types di⁄ers. On the other hand, the player chooses ai;N ￿ b ￿N [t0] only
if both players almost truthfully report all their kth-order expectation for every k up to N, which requires
those ￿k￿ s to be large enough. Since
P1
k=1 ￿k = 1, it does not seem obvious to us how to resolve this tension
for a large N.
10We add this safe action a0 to make it easier to rule out certain actions as not being ￿￿ rationalizable.
16and (B) a2 must be ￿￿rationalizable for these opponents. Pick one t￿i which is believed to
play a2 by ti. Since a2 is ￿￿rationalizable for t￿i, we can similarly get (A) player ￿i must
believe most of player i￿ s types in the support of ￿￿
￿i [t￿i] are playing a3; and (B) a3 must
be ￿￿rationalizable for these player i￿ s types. Doing this inductively, we can get an in￿nite
chain of ￿￿rationalization.
ti = b t(1) ! b t(2) ! b t(3) ! b t(4) ! b t(5) ! ￿￿￿such that (6)
b t(k) 2 Ti if k is odd and b t(k) 2 T￿i if k is even;





k is ￿ ￿ rationalizable for b t(k).
Since ti is a ￿nite type, some type in Ti must recur in this in￿nite chain. That is, we can
￿nd b t(n) = b t(m) = e t(1) 2 Ti such that an and am are both ￿￿rationalizable for e t(1) and
an 6= am.
Recall that a player can always achieve the maximal payo⁄ by taking the safe action
a0. Since ￿ is small enough, in order to make an ￿￿rationalizable for e t(1), an+1 must be
￿￿rationalizable for most of e t(1)￿ s opponent￿ s types in the support of ￿￿ ￿
e t(1)
￿
; to make am
￿￿rationalizable for e t(1), am+1 must be ￿￿rationalizable for most of e t(1)￿ s opponent￿ s types
in the support of ￿￿ ￿
e t(1)
￿
. Hence, there exists some type e t(2) in the support of ￿￿ ￿
e t(1)
￿
such that an+1 and am+1 are both ￿￿rationalizable for e t(2). Similarly, we can pick e t(k) in
this way for all k ￿ 2. Hence, we can construct another common chain of ￿￿rationalization
for both an and am:
e t(1) ! e t(2) ! e t(3) ! e t(4) ! e t(5) ! ￿￿￿such that









if k is odd;









if k is even.
Since the players are also trying to coordinate with nature in this game, we also have the
property (C) for a small enough ￿ and any action a ￿￿rationalizable for a type t, (a)1 = 0 i⁄
b ￿1 (t) 2 [0; 1
2]. We then reach a contradiction by applying property (C) to this common chain
of rationalization for an and am. First, an 6= am implies (an)k￿ = 1 6= 0 = (am)k￿ for some k￿.
Second, by the de￿nitions of an and am, (an+k￿￿1)1 = (an)k￿ = 1 6= 0 = (am)k￿ = (am+k￿￿1)1,
17but property (C) implies,
(a
n+k￿￿1)1 = (a




















because both an+k￿￿1 and am+k￿￿1 are ￿￿rationalizable for e t(k￿) in the common chain above.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, a1 = 2 Ri (ti;￿).
In the rigorous proof for Proposition 2 in Appendix A.3.1, we formalize the argument
above. We make the game ￿nite by truncating an into its ￿rst N coordinates and proceed in
four steps. In step 1, we show that if N is su¢ ciently large, we can still ￿nd an and am in the
￿￿rationalization chain in (6), such that the N-truncation of an and am are distinct. Step 2
proves properties (A) and (C). Step 3 constructs the common chain of ￿￿rationalization for
an and am as above. Step 4 derives the contradiction. In the proof, ￿ = M
16 is small enough
to achieve our goal.
Proposition 2 dus(t￿
i;ti) ￿ M
16 for any ￿nite type ti. Hence, ￿nite types are not dense under
dus.
In fact, Proposition 2 can be used to prove a stronger result.
Theorem 2 Finite types are nowhere dense under dus.
Since the uniform-weak topology is ￿ner than the uniform strategic topology by The-
orem 1, ￿nite types are nowhere dense under duw as well. The proofs of Proposition 2 and
Theorem 2 are relegated to Appendix A.3.1 and A.3.2, respectively.
Recall that Ely and Peski (2007) de￿ne a critical type to be a type around which the
strategic topology is strictly stronger than the product topology. Recall also that Di Tillio
and Faingold (2007) show that the strategic topology is equivalent to the uniform-weak
topology around ￿nite types. As shown in Ely and Peski (2007), every ￿nite type is critical
but not conversely. In particular, the type t￿
i we construct is an in￿nite critical type. To see
this, recall that b Ti ￿ b T￿i ￿ Ti ￿Tj is the smallest belief-closed set such that t￿
i 2 b Ti. Clearly,
18b Ti ￿ b T￿i is of common 1-belief under t￿. By monotonicity of the common 1-belief operator,






2 Ti ￿ Tj under which both t1 and t2 have the ￿rst-order belief
Pr(￿ = 1) = Pr(￿ = 0) = 1
2. For all (t1;t2) 2 b Ti ￿ b T￿i, the ￿rst-order beliefs of t1 and t2




does not belong to the closure of
b Ti ￿ b T￿i. Hence, the closure of b Ti ￿ b T￿i is a proper closed subset of Ti ￿ Tj. By (Ely and
Peski, 2007, Theorem 3), we conclude t￿ is a critical type. Since ￿nite types are dense under
the strategic topology by (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2006, Theorem 3), Proposition 2
shows that strategic convergence to an in￿nite critical type does not imply uniform-weak
convergence to this critical type.
5 Discussion
5.1 The uniform strategic topology
DFM study the uniform strategic topology in contrast to the strategic topology they propose.
The denseness result from Section 4 demonstrates one di⁄erence between the two topologies.
In particular, our example shows that it is sometimes hard to approximate complicated types
with ￿nite types when we require uniformity of this approximation among all ￿nite games.
However, such a uniform approximation may still be relevant.
Suppose we are facing a mechanism design problem where agents￿information is mod-
eled with a complicated type space T. DFM￿ s denseness results on strategic topology states
that given any ￿xed game G, we can ￿nd a simple type space T 0 to approximate T in terms
of strategic behaviors in G. However, to solve a mechanism design problem is to search for a
mechanism (game form) among all possible games. Hence, to ensure that the optimal solu-
tion on T 0 incurs approximately no loss of accuracy, it is crucial that the strategic behaviors
under T 0 approximate those under T in all mechanisms instead of merely in some G. Thus,
the uniform strategic topology is free of such a problem so long as the mechanism is searched
within bounded ￿nite games.11
11Suppose that G0 is the optimal mechanism for the simpler type space T0, which is close to the true type
195.2 Comparison of our proof to that of Di Tillio and Faingold
(2007)
Di Tillio and Faingold (2007) prove that the uniform-weak topology is ￿ner than the strategic
topology around ￿nite types. Our ￿rst main result extends this to all types. In Di Tillio
and Faingold￿ s proof, they exploit the fact that in a ￿nite type space, there is a minimal
uniform-weak distance between any two di⁄erent types within this type space. Thus, when
duw(tn
i ;ti) is su¢ ciently small relative to the minimum uniform-weak distance of the ￿nite
type space containing ti, the two types tn
i and ti must believe in approximately the same set
of opponents with approximately the same distribution, and no double-counting problem is
involved. In our proof, we take advantage of the ￿niteness of games and solve the double-
counting problem by applying the minimax argument.
5.3 In￿nite order implications of Theorem 1
It is natural to doubt whether one can obtain information about the entire hierarchy of
beliefs of types. Therefore, types which are close under the product topology may still be
deemed indistinguishable from a practical viewpoint. In accordance with this idea, extensive
studies have been carried out on ￿nite-order implications of notions associated with a type.
In particular, Lipman (2003) shows that common-prior types are dense under the product
topology, while Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that in a ￿xed game without common-
knowledge restrictions on payo⁄s, types with unique rationalizable actions are open and
dense.
As pointed out by DFM, neither the result in Lipman (2003) nor the result in Weinstein
and Yildiz (2007) holds when we consider the strategic topology instead of the product
space T in the strategic topology. The behaviors of T and T0 in G0 might still be quite di⁄erent. This is
especially true if G0 has a lot of actions. Recall that the strategic distance ds (ti;si) for types ti and si in Ti
is a weighted sum of the di⁄erence between the behaviors of ti and si in all bounded ￿nite game. If G0 has m
actions with m being large, ds (ti;si) assigns a small weight ￿m on the di⁄erence between the behaviors of
ti and si in G0. Therefore, even if ds (ti;si) is small, the two types ti and si may still exhibit quite di⁄erent
behaviors in G0. However, this problem can be avoided if we approximate T by T00 which is close to T in
the uniform strategic topology.
20topology. DFM show that there is an open set in the strategic topology which consists
entirely of types with noncommon priors or multiple rationalizable actions. That is, in
these cases strategic open sets are rich enough to separate noncommon-prior types from
common-prior types, or types with multiple rationalizable actions from types with unique
rationalizable actions. A straightforward consequence of Theorem 1 is that these strategic
open sets identi￿ed in DFM￿ s examples must contain uniform-weak open sets. Hence, neither
Lipman￿ s result nor that of Weinstein and Yildiz￿ s holds in the uniform-weak topology.
5.4 The distance d￿￿
The uniform-weak topology is a natural way of strengthening the product topology. In DFM￿ s
Proposition 2, they propose a metric d￿￿ which also implies uniform strategic convergence.
Two types are close under d￿￿ if they have uniformly close expectations on all bounded
functions measurable with respect to the kth-order beliefs for some k. However, this metric
d￿￿ is too strong in the sense that even when we restrict attention to ￿nite-order beliefs, the
topology it generates is still strictly stronger than the standard weak￿ topology.
In particular, consider an example in Chen and Xiong (2008). Suppose that ￿ = f0;1g.
Let t be a complete information type under which it is common 1-belief that "￿ = 1." Let















-belief that "￿ = 1" under tn,
and moreover, duw (tn;t) ! 0. By Theorem 1, we have dus (tn;t) ! 0. However, as shown
in Chen and Xiong (2008), tn does not converge to t under d￿￿. In contrast to the result of
Di Tillio and Faingold (2007), this example also demonstrates that even if the limit type is
a ￿nite type, the (uniform) strategic convergence does not imply the d￿￿￿convergence.
21A Appendix
A.1 Alternative characterizations of the ￿￿ICR set
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall that R
0
i (ti;G;￿) = R0
i (ti;G;￿) = Ai and for k ￿ 1, ai 2 Rk
i (ti;G;￿) i⁄ there exists
a measurable function ￿￿i : ￿ ￿ T￿i ! ￿(A￿i) such that
supp￿￿i (￿;t￿i) ￿ R
k￿1
￿i (t￿i;G;￿) for ￿
￿





i;￿) ￿ ￿￿i (￿;t￿i)]￿
￿
i (ti)[(￿;dt￿i)] ￿ ￿￿ for all a
0
i 2 Ai, (8)
and ai 2 R
k
i (ti;G;￿) i⁄ there exists a measurable function ￿￿i : ￿ ￿ T
k￿1










￿i (t￿i;G;￿) for t
k



























￿ ￿￿ for all a
0
i 2 Ai (10)




i (ti;G;￿) = Rk
i (ti;G;￿) for every integer k ￿ 0, every ti, and every player i.
Proof. We prove this claim by induction on k. For k = 0, the lemma holds by de￿nition.
Now suppose that the lemma holds for some nonnegative integer k ￿ 1.
(R
k
i (ti;G;￿) ￿ Rk
i (ti;G;￿)) Suppose ai 2 R
k
i (ti;G;￿). Then, there exists a mea-
surable function ￿￿i : ￿ ￿ T
k￿1
￿i ! ￿(A￿i) such that (9) and (10) hold. Now consider
￿￿
￿i : ￿￿T￿i ! ￿(A￿i) such that ￿￿






for all (￿;t￿i) 2 ￿￿T￿i. Note
that ￿￿
￿i is measurable because ￿￿i is measurable and ￿ ￿ T￿i is a second countable space
endowed with the Borel ￿-algebra (see (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, 4.43 Theorem)). First,
(7) follows because the marginal distribution of ￿￿
i (ti) on ￿￿T
k￿1
￿i agrees with tk
i and both

























































where the ￿rst equality is due to the de￿nition of ￿￿
￿i and the second is again because the
marginal distribution of ￿￿
i (ti) on ￿ ￿ T
k￿1
￿i agrees with tk





i (ti;G;￿) ￿ Rk
i (ti;G;￿)) Suppose ai 2 Rk
i (ti;G;￿). Hence, there exists measurable
function ￿￿i : ￿ ￿ T￿i ! ￿(A￿i) such that (7) and (8) hold. Since ￿ ￿ T￿i is a compact
metric space, it is a standard Borel space. Hence, there is a regular conditional distribution of
￿￿
i (ti) on ￿￿T
k￿1









































Then, since ￿￿i is a measurable function from ￿ ￿ T￿i to <jA￿ij, by (Dudley, 2002, 10.2.5.
Theorem), ￿￿












￿i agrees with tk
























































i;￿) ￿ ￿￿i (￿;t￿i)]￿
￿
i (ti)[(￿;dt￿i)] ￿ ￿￿
where the ￿rst equality is because the marginal distribution of ￿￿




i and is also because of the de￿nition of ￿￿
￿i, and the second equality follows from the
law of iterated expectation (see (Dudley, 2002, 10.2.1. Theorem)). Therefore, (8) holds and
hence ai 2 R
k
i (ti;G;￿).
23A.1.2 The proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 For any positive integer k, any ￿ ￿ 0, any ￿nite game G, and any type ti 2 Ti,
ai 2 Rk
i (ti;G;￿) if and only if for every ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 ￿(Ainfaig) there is a valid conjecture
￿￿i [￿] : ￿ ￿ T
k￿1



















￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿. (11)
Proof. Recall ￿rst a Minimax Theorem due to Fan (1952). Let f be a real-valued function
de￿ned on a product space X ￿ Y . Say f is convex-like on X if for every x, x0 2 X and
c 2 [0;1], there is some x00 2 X such that f (x00;y) ￿ cf (x;y)+(1 ￿ c)f (x0;y) for all y 2 Y .
Say f is concave-like on Y if for every y, y0 2 Y and c 2 [0;1], there is some y00 2 Y such
that f (x;y00) ￿ cf (x;y) + (1 ￿ c)f (x;y0) for all x 2 X.
Fan￿ s Minimax Theorem Let X be a compact Hausdor⁄ space and Y an arbitrary set
(not topologized). Let f be a real-valued function on X￿Y such that for every y 2 Y , f(￿;y)














￿￿i : ￿ ￿ T
k￿1















, 8￿ 2 X, ￿￿i 2 Y .
Obviously, f is convex-like on X, concave-like on Y , and f(￿;￿￿i) is lower semi-continuous
on X for every ￿￿i. Hence, by Fan￿ s Minimax Theorem, we have min￿2X sup￿￿i2Y f(x;y) =
sup￿￿i2Y min￿2X f(x;y). First, sup￿￿i2Y min￿2X f(x;y) ￿ ￿￿ if and only if for any ￿ > 0,
there is a conjecture ￿￿i 2 Y such that f (￿;￿￿i) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ for all ￿ 2 X. By Lemma 1 and
DFM￿ s Lemma 1, sup￿￿i2Y min￿2X f(x;y) ￿ ￿￿ is therefore equivalent to ai 2 Rk
i (ti;G;￿).
Similarly, min￿2X sup￿￿i2Y f(x;y) ￿ ￿￿ is equivalent to for every ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 X, there is
some valid conjecture ￿￿i [￿] 2 Y such that (11) hold.￿
24A.2 The proof of Proposition 1
A.2.1 The proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3 Consider a separable metric space (Y;dY), a Borel set F ￿ Y , and " > 0.
Suppose f : F ! Z is a measurable function where Z is a measurable space. Then, there
is a measurable function f" : F " ! Z such that f" = f on F, and for every y 2 F "nF,
f" (y) = f (y0) for some y0 2 F with dY (y;y0) < ".
Proof. Since F is a subset of a separable metric space, it is also separable under the
relative topology (see (Dudley, 2002, p.32)). Let fy1;y2;:::g be a countable dense subset
of F. For any y 2 Y , let B (y;") denote the "-open ball around y. First, we claim that
F " = [1
m=1B (ym;"). Clearly, F " ￿ [1
m=1B (ym;"). To see F " ￿ [1
m=1B (ym;"), suppose
y 2 F ". Then, there is some y0 2 F such that dY (y;y0) < ". Hence, B (y;") \ F 6= ?.
Since B (y;") \ F is relatively open in F and fy1;y2;:::g is dense in F, there is m such that
ym 2 B (y;") \ F. Hence, dY (ym;y) < " and therefore y 2 B (ym;").


















m=1 partitions F ". Moreover, for any m 2 Z+, since the sets in fB (ym;")g
1
m=1






f (y), if y 2 F,
f (ym￿) if y = 2 F and y 2 Bm￿.
Then, by de￿nition f" satis￿es the property that f" = f on F, and for every y 2 F "nF,
f" (y) = f (y0) for some y0 2 F with dY (y;y0) < ".














where BmnF = fy 2 Y : y 2 Bm and y = 2 Fg.
25Since f is a measurable function and Z0 is measurable, f￿1 (Z0) is also measurable. For









measurable, because it is a countable union of measurable sets. Therefore, (f")
￿1 (Z0) is
measurable, and f" is a measurable function.￿
A.2.2 The proof of Proposition 1






￿ ", we have Rk
i (ti;G;￿) ￿ Rk
i (si;G;￿ + 6M") for every integer k ￿ 0.
Proof. Let G be a ￿nite game. Since G is ￿xed, we will drop hereafter the explicit reference
of G from our notation for expositional ease. We prove the proposition by induction. Suppose
ai 2 Rk
i (ti;￿). By Lemma 1, there is a valid conjecture ￿￿i : ￿ ￿ T
k￿1






















￿ ￿￿ for all a
0
i 2 Ainfaig. (12)
Our goal is to show that ai 2 Rk
i (si;￿ + 6M").
Consider ￿rst the case of k = 1. By De￿nition 1, ￿ ￿ T
k￿1
￿i = ￿ and hence ￿￿i is
a measurable function from ￿ to ￿(A￿i). Let ￿0
￿i = ￿￿i. Since R0
￿i (t￿i;￿) = A￿i, ￿0
￿i
is trivially valid. If " ￿ 1, the claim trivially holds because the payo⁄ is bounded by M
and hence Rk
i (si;G;￿ + 6M") = Ai. Now suppose " < 1. Then, since we endow ￿ with the
discrete metric, (￿0)
" = ￿0 for any ￿0 ￿ ￿. Hence, js1
i (￿0) ￿ t1
i (￿0)j ￿ " since ￿1 (t1
i;s1
i) ￿ ".
Let A￿ = gi (ai;a0
i;￿) ￿ ￿0
￿i (￿) and B￿ = s1

















where the last inequality is due to
￿ ￿A￿￿ ￿ ￿ 2M and js1
i (￿0) ￿ t1
i (￿0)j ￿ " in particular for
￿0 =
￿
￿ 2 ￿ : B￿ < 0
￿
and for ￿0 =
￿
￿ 2 ￿ : B￿ ￿ 0
￿




￿￿ ￿ 4M". Hence, ai 2 Rk
i (si;￿ + 6M").
Now consider the induction step. By Lemma 2, to prove ai 2 Rk
i (si;￿ + 6M"), it
su¢ ces to show that for every ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 ￿(Ainfaig), there is a valid conjecture ￿0
￿i





















￿ ￿￿ ￿ 6M" ￿ ￿. (F)









any q and q0 in ￿(A￿i). Pick an arbitrary positive integer h. We can discretize ￿(A￿i) with
a ￿nite partition f￿mg
￿
m=1 such that for each m there is some qm 2 ￿m with kq ￿ qmkjA￿ij ￿




























































n=1 where N = j￿j ￿ ￿ such that
gi (ai;￿;￿1) ￿ q
m1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ gi (ai;￿;￿N) ￿ q
mN.
Hereafter, we write Fn instead of F ￿n













De￿ne E1 = (F1)








































We now proceed to de￿ne the conjecture ￿0
￿i. We divide ￿ ￿ T
k￿1























, and de￿ne ￿0
￿i on these three areas
respectively.
First, for area (I), let ￿0




￿i (t￿i;￿ + 6M") is up-
per hemi-continuous under the product topology on T
k￿1
￿i , by Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski
12We can make each ￿m measurable, so that each F￿
m is also measurable.













￿i . Then, we de￿ne ￿0
￿i as r(￿) on area
(III). Third, we extend the de￿nition of ￿0
￿i from area (I) to area (II) by Lemma 3. Recall
that fFng is a partition of T
k￿1
￿i . Since ￿￿i is valid, it is measurable on Fn for every n. By
Lemma 3, there is a measurable function ￿
n
￿i (￿) on (Fn)
" such that ￿
n













































Recall also that En ￿ (Fn)






. In sum, we
de￿ne the conjecture ￿0
￿i : ￿ ￿ T
k￿1











































￿i is valid in areas (I) and (III) by the de￿nition of r(￿) and the validity of
￿￿i. In area (II), by the induction hypothesis and the extension ￿
n
￿i de￿ned above, ￿0
￿i is
also valid.
It remains to show that the inequality (F) holds under ￿0
￿i. It is a direct consequence
of the following three lemmas which we will prove later.
Lemma 4 We have
N X
n=1
[gi (ai;￿;￿n) ￿ q
mn]t
k




Lemma 4 says that replacing on the left-hand side of (12) a0
i by ￿ and ￿￿i by qmn on
each Fn would induce at most a loss
2MjA￿ij
h .
























[gi (ai;￿;￿n) ￿ q
mn]s
k




28Lemma 5 says that by using
PN
n=1 [gi (ai;￿;￿n) ￿ qmn]sk
i [En] to approximate the left-







, which is at most 2M", and the other results from the approximation
of ￿0
￿i by qmn on En, which is at most
2MjA￿ij
h .
Lemma 6 We have
N X
n=1










Lemma 6 is a generalization of step 5 in Section 3 which says that we only have to
compare the beliefs of tk
i and sk
i on the probabilities of sets fEng and fFng. We will show
that the di⁄erence of the two approximated payo⁄s is at most 4M".



























h ! 0 as h ! 1, we can choose h large enough so that (F) holds. Hence, for
every ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 ￿(Ainfaig), there is a valid conjecture ￿0
￿i under which (F) holds.
Thus, by Lemma 2, ai 2 Rk
i (si;￿ + 6M").￿
We now prove Lemmas 4￿ 6.























n=1 is a partition of T
k￿1

























































































By combining (18)￿ (20), we get (15).￿



































































































2 En and fEng
N





























































































































Then, (16) follows by combining (21)￿ (23).￿
Proof of Lemma 6 We want to show that
N X
n=1










30Recall that An = gi (ai;￿;￿n) ￿ qmn and Bn = sk
i (En) ￿ tk
i (Fn). Moreover, for notational
convenience, let Cn = AN￿n+1 and Dn = BN￿n+1 for n = 1;:::;N.










n ￿ ￿4M". (25)





n=1 CnDn ￿ ￿2M", which concludes the proof of (24) and the lemma. Claim
1 is a technical intermediate step which will be used in the proofs for Claims 2 and 3.
Claim 1 We have
Pl
n=1 Bn ￿ ￿" and
Pl
n=1 Dn ￿ " for 1 ￿ l ￿ N.
Proof. To see
Pl































where the ￿rst equality is by the de￿nition of Bn; the second equality follows from our
construction that sets in fFng
N
n=1 are pair-wise disjoint and sets in fEng
N
n=1 are pair-wise



































































n=1 Dn ￿ " by (26).￿
Claim 2
PL
n=1 AnBn ￿ ￿2M".
Proof. We establish this claim in two steps:



















￿ 0 for n < l.
31We prove the existence of B by induction on l. If l = 1, let B = B1. Then, properties
(1) and (3) are obvious. Property (2) is due to Claim 1. Property (4) is vacuously true. Now






2 <l which satis￿es properties
(1)￿ (4). We now proceed to de￿ne B as follows so that B is a (l + 1)-vector which makes













































































+Bl+1 by our de￿nition of B; the






















































n=1 Bn ￿ ￿" by Claim 1.

































+ Al+1Bl+1 when Z
l














































+ Al+1Bl+1; the second inequality is due to the induction hypothesis. Hence, property
(3) is satis￿ed.




































n=1 AnBn ￿ ￿2M".
By step 1, we can ￿nd a L-vector B which satis￿es properties (1)￿ (4). First, suppose
B
L
￿ 0. Then, by property (4), B
n

















where the ￿rst inequality follows from property (3); the second inequality follows because
B
n


























where the ￿rst inequality follows from property (3); the second inequality follows because
AL and B
L
are both nonnegative, i.e., ALB
L
￿ 0; the third inequality follows from property
(4) and jAnj ￿ 2M for every n; the last inequality follows from property (2).
Claim 3
PN￿L





n=1 (￿Cn)(￿Dn). Since Cn is increasing in n and
Cn ￿ 0 for all N ￿ L ￿ n ￿ 1, it follows that (￿Cn) is decreasing in n and (￿Cn) ￿ 0
for all N ￿ L ￿ n ￿ 1. Moreover, Claim 1 implies that
Pl
n=1 (￿Dn) ￿ ￿" for 1 ￿ l ￿ N.
Hence, following the proof of Claim 2, and replacing An, Bn, and L in the proof with (￿Cn),
(￿Dn), and (N ￿ L) respectively, we get
PN￿L
n=1 CnDn ￿ ￿2".￿
33A.3 Proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorem 2
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 dus(t￿
i;ti) ￿ M
16 for any ￿nite type ti. Hence, ￿nite types are not dense under
dus.
Proof. Pick any ￿nite type ti. Let Ti ￿T￿i ￿ Ti ￿T￿i be the smallest belief-closed set such
that ti 2 Ti. Since ti is a ￿nite type, jTi ￿ T￿ij < 1. For simplicity, we abbreviate jTi ￿ T￿ij
as jTj. Henceforth, we ￿x
N = 20jTj.
We will consider a ￿nite game with every player￿ s action space being the N-truncation of a0,
a1, a2,... where for every n ￿ 0, an is de￿ned as in Section 4. From now on, for every n ￿ 0,
we will abuse notation and denote the ￿nite truncation of an = ((an)1 ;:::;(an)N) also by an.
Consider the following ￿nite game, G = (Ai;gi)i=1;2 where for i = 1;2, Ai = fa0;a1;a2;:::g
and for any ai = ((ai)1 ;:::;(ai)N) 2 Ai, a￿i = ((a￿i)1 ;:::;(a￿i)N) 2 A￿i and ￿ 2 ￿,
gi [ai; a￿i; ￿] =
8
> > > <
> > > :















, if ai 6= a0.
(27)
Since the game is now ￿xed, we will simplify the notation in this proof by writing Ri (ti;￿)
instead of Ri (ti;G;￿). We prove that dus(t￿
i;ti) ￿ M
16 by establishing the following two
claims:
Claim 4 a1 2 Ri (t￿
i;0).
Proof. Let t(1) = t￿





by b Ri (t(k);0) =
￿
ak￿
if k is odd and
b R￿i (t(k);0) =
￿
ak￿
if k is even. By equation (5), for any odd k, ￿k
￿i : ￿ ￿ T￿i ! ￿(A￿i)
such that ￿k
￿i (￿;t￿i) ￿ ￿ak+1 for all (￿;t￿i), ak is a 0￿best reply for type t(k) under ￿k
￿i.
The case with an even k is similar. Hence, R(0) satis￿es the 0￿best reply property in the
type space b Ti ￿ b T￿i. Hence, Ri (t(k);0) ￿ Ri (t(k);0).￿






Proof. In this proof, it is convenient for us to denote by ￿si;￿￿i 2 ￿(A￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ T￿i) the





2 A￿i ￿ ￿,














Clearly, marg￿￿T￿i￿si;￿￿i = ￿￿
i [si]. We prove the result in four steps.
Step 1 [(am)1 ;:::;(am)C] 6= [(an)1 ;:::;(an)C] for any C ￿ 18, n 6= m, and n ￿ C.
We denote the kth block in a1 as
Bk =
8
> > > > > > <








if k is even.





















l2+1. Observe that since n 6= m, an
and am cannot have an interior block at the same position. That is, there is no l1 and l2




















Hence, to prove [(am)1 ;:::;(am)C] 6= [(an)1 ;:::;(an)C], it su¢ ces to show [(an)1 ;:::;(an)C]
contains an interior block. For n ￿ C, suppose that an starts with part of Bh+1. That is,
we have deleted (B1;:::;Bh) from a1 to get an. Also, to get an, we need to delete exactly the
￿rst n ￿ 1 coordinates of a1. Hence,
h(h + 1)
2
￿ n ￿ 1 ) h
2 ￿ 2n ￿ 2,
where
h(h+1)
2 corresponds to the number of coordinates in (B1;:::;Bh).
35The ￿rst two blocks in an are (parts of) Bh+1 and Bh+2, so the combined coordinates are
at most 2h+3. If 2h+3 ￿ C ￿1, an contains Bh+2 as an interior block. Since h ￿
p
2n ￿ 2
and n ￿ C, we have 2h+3 ￿ 2
p
2C ￿ 2+3. With C ￿ 18, we have 2
p
2C ￿ 2+3 ￿ C ￿1.
Therefore, an contains Bh+2 as an interior block if C ￿ 18. Since an and am cannot have an
interior block at the same position, we conclude [(am)1 ;:::;(am)C] 6= [(an)1 ;:::;(an)C].







16￿best reply to a valid conjecture ￿￿i, we have






2. ￿ti;￿￿i (an+1) ￿ 3
4.
To see (1), let a￿i = ((a￿i)1 ;:::;(a￿i)N) 2 A￿i. Let ￿ ￿ ￿ti;￿￿i and E￿ (￿) ￿
R
(￿)d￿.
For n ￿ 1, we have E￿ [gi (an;a￿i;￿)] ￿ E￿
￿
￿M ￿ [(an)1 ￿ ￿]
2￿
. Since ￿ 2 f0;1g, ￿
2 = ￿.






























M if (an)1 = 1.










































We now prove (2). Suppose ￿ (an+1) = ￿. We have
￿ E￿ [gi (an;an+1;￿)] ￿ E￿ [gi (a0;an+1;￿)] ￿ 0;
￿ E￿ [gi (an;a0;￿)] ￿ E￿ [gi (a0;a0;￿)] ￿ ￿M
4 , which is because gi (an;a0;￿) ￿ ￿M
4 and
gi (a0;a0;￿) = 0;
￿ E￿ [gi (an;am;￿)] ￿ E￿ [gi (a0;am;￿)] ￿ ￿M for any m = 2 f0;n + 1g. To see this, note
































To make an a M
16￿rationalizable action for t, we must have







That is, ￿ ￿ 3
4.

















, an is a M
16￿best reply for ti under some valid conjecture ￿n
￿i. Let
￿n ￿ ￿ti;￿n
￿i. By property (2) in step 2, ￿n (an+1) ￿ 3







16￿best reply for ti under some valid conjecture ￿m
￿i. Let ￿m ￿ ￿ti;￿m
￿i. By property (2)
in step 2, ￿m (am+1) ￿ 3





, ￿n (an+1) ￿ 3
4, and
￿m (am+1) ￿ 3














































































. By property (2) in step 2, we can construct a
chain of rationalization where the ￿rst jTj + 1 elements are as follows
ti = b t(1) ! b t(2) ! ::: ! b t(jTj) ! b t(jTj + 1) ! ￿￿￿
such that b t(k) 2 Ti if n is odd and b t(k) 2 T￿i if k is even;








￿ rationalizable for b t(k).
37Recall that jTj = jTi￿T￿ij, there exists b t(n) = b t(m) ￿ e t(1) 2 Ti such that n < m ￿ jTj+1.










. By repeatedly applying step 3, we can
construct two chains of rationalization (for an and am, respectively), which have the common
￿rst 19jTj ￿ 1 elements as follows,
e t(1) ! e t(2) ! ::: ! e t(19jTj ￿ 2) ! e t(19jTj ￿ 1) ! ￿￿￿
such that for k ￿ 19jTj ￿ 1,











if k is odd;











if k is even.



















































Since 19jTj ￿ 1 ￿ 18, n 6= m, and n ￿ 19jTj ￿ 1, by step 1 (an)k￿ 6= (am)k￿ for some
1 ￿ k￿ ￿ 19jTj ￿ 1, i.e.
￿
an+k￿￿1￿
1 = 0 < 1 =
￿
am+k￿￿1￿
1. By Property (1) in step 2,
￿
an+k￿￿1￿
1 = 0 implies b ￿1
￿






1 = 1 implies b ￿1
￿










A.3.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 Finite types are nowhere dense under dus.
Proof. Let T F denote the closure of the set of ￿nite types under dus. It su¢ ces to
show that for any ￿nite type ti, there is a sequence of types fti (n)g
1




! 0. Let s￿
i be the unique type whose iterated expectation is y￿ =
(0;1;0;0;1;1;1;0;0;0;0;:::). Recall t￿
￿i 2 T￿i is the unique type which generates the iterated



























i is a homeomorphism between Ti and ￿(￿ ￿ T￿i), there is some type ti (n) with
￿￿
i (ti (n)) = ￿n. Recall that for any si 2 Ti, the marginal distribution of ￿￿
i (si) on Y
k￿1
￿i
agrees with e tk
i. Hence, by (28), for any k ￿ 1 and Borel set E ￿ Y
k￿1

















We now divide the rest of the proof into the following two steps.
Step 1 dus ￿
ti (n);ti
￿
! 0 as n ! 1.
We show that duw ￿
ti (n);ti
￿














































Step 2 ti (n) 2 T nT F for every n ￿ 8.
We prove this claim by showing that dus (ti (n);ti) ￿ M
2n for any ￿nite type ti and
n ￿ 8. Pick any ￿nite type ti. Let Ti ￿ T￿i ￿ Ti ￿ T￿i be the smallest belief-closed set such
that ti 2 Ti. Since ti is a ￿nite type, jTi ￿ T￿ij < 1. Following the proof of Proposition
2 in Appendix A.3.1, we can construct a ￿nite game G = (Aj;gj)j=i;￿i (as de￿ned in (27))











any t￿i 2 T￿i. Moreover, the payo⁄s in G are always between ￿M and 0. Based upon







i = Ai ￿ fz1;z2g, A0
￿i = A￿i,
g0
￿i [(ai;z);a￿i;￿] = g￿i(ai;a￿i;￿), and
g
0





n , if z = z1;
M, if z = z2, a￿i = a1;
0, if z = z2, a￿i 6= a1.
Since the payo⁄s in G are between ￿M and 0, it follows that the payo⁄s in G0 are between
￿M and M. We now divide the proof of step 2 into the following three substeps.






Let b Ti ￿ b T￿i ￿ Ti ￿ T￿i be the smallest belief-closed subset such that t￿






, it su¢ ces to show that R￿i (s￿i;G;0) ￿ R￿i (s￿i;G0;0) for all s￿i 2 b T￿i.
39Let ai 2 Ri (si;G;0). Then, there is some valid conjecture ￿￿i such that ai is a 0￿best reply
to ￿￿i. Hence, there is a function zsi : Ai ! fz1;z2g such that (ai;zsi (ai)) is a 0￿best reply






b Ri (si;0) = f(ai;z) : ai 2 Ri (si;G;0) and z = zsi (ai)g, 8si 2 b Ti,
b R￿i (s￿i;0) = R￿i (s￿i;G;0), 8t￿i 2 b T￿i.
We claim that b R(0)has the 0￿best reply property in G0 for the type space b Ti ￿ b T￿i. By
our construction, it su¢ ces to check player ￿i. Let a￿i 2 R￿i (s￿i;G;0). Hence, there is a
valid conjecture ￿i such that a￿i is a 0￿best reply under ￿i for type s￿i in G. We de￿ne a
new conjecture ￿0
i such that ￿0
i (￿;si)[ai;z] = ￿i (￿;si)[ai] if z = zsi (ai); ￿0
i (￿;si)[ai;z] = 0
otherwise. Then, by choosing any action a0
￿i, player ￿i gets exactly the same payo⁄ under
the conjecture ￿0
i in G0 as the payo⁄ under the conjecture ￿i in G. Hence, a￿i remains a
0￿best reply to ￿0
i in G0. Therefore, R￿i (s￿i;G;0) ￿ R￿i (s￿i;G0;0).





for any t￿i 2 T￿i.























































, 8t￿i 2 T￿i.






16￿best reply property in G for the type space Ti ￿ T￿i.










. Hence, there is a valid
conjecture ￿￿i such that (ai;z) is a M
16￿best reply under ￿￿i for type ti in G0. Then, ai is a
M




























, there is a valid conjecture ￿0
i such that a￿i is a M
16￿best
40reply under ￿0







Note that by choosing any action a0
￿i, player ￿i gets exactly the same payo⁄ under the
conjecture ￿0
i in G0 as the payo⁄ under the conjecture ￿i in G. Therefore, a￿i remains a
M











Step 2.3 dus (ti (n);ti) ￿ M
2n for every n ￿ 8.
Consider the following conjecture for player i.




￿a1, if t￿i = t￿
￿i;
some measurable selection from R￿i (t￿i;G;0), otherwise.
By step 2.1, b ￿￿i is valid in G0. Let ai be a 0￿best reply under b ￿￿i for type ti (n) in G. We






that dus (ti (n);ti) ￿ M
2n.
First, we show that (ai;z2) 2 Ri (ti (n);G0;0). Since ai is a 0￿best reply under b ￿￿i for





i ([ai;z2];[ai;z1];￿) ￿ b ￿￿i (￿;t￿i)]￿
￿
i (ti (n))[(￿;dt￿i)] ￿ 0.
Recall that ￿￿




￿ = 0;t￿i = t￿
￿i
￿￿
= 1. Hence, ￿￿
i (ti (n))
￿￿









































for n ￿ 8. Since ￿￿
i (ti)[T￿i] = 1,
any valid conjecture ￿0
￿i which M
2n￿rationalizes ai for ti must satisfy ￿0
￿i (￿;t￿i)[a1] = 0 for

























for n ￿ 8.￿
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